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The Probable Trend of Interest Rates
By DAVID FRIDAY
Professor of Economics, University of Michigan
THE probable trend of interest ratesin the United States for the next
two years will depend upon the forces
which operate on the capital market
during that period. Obvious as this
sentence may seem, it nevertheless im-
plies a deal of wisdom about the causes
which underlie the movements of
interest rates. It is wisdom, too,
which it took the world a number of
centuries to acquire, and which is even
yet far from being a part of our common
stock of knowledge. For this implies
that interest is a price, and that, like
all prices, it is the product of the
workings of a market.
INTEREST IS A PRICE WHICH MUST
BE FORECAST BY A STUDY OF CAP-
ITAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Since it is a market price, the forces
which determine it must manifest
themselves upon that market, either in
the form of changes in supply or in the
form of alterations in demand. Noth-
ing can influence the rate of interest,
any more than other prices, unless it
operates to change either the supply or
the demand. This implication of the
first sentence may be considered as
elemental, and may be accepted with-
out argument or proof. So much has
been established since the day when
John Locke, at the close of the 17th
century, wrote his Considerations of
the Consequences of the Lowering of
Interest and Raising the Value of
Money.
In order to forecast the probable
trend of interest rates, then, we must
forecast the probable course of the
demand for capital and the probable
supply of capital at different rates of
interest.
THE SOURCE OF CAPITAL
The supply of capital during any
given period of time consists of the
excess of production over consumption.
If, within the current year, the people
of the United States produce fifty
billion dollars’ worth of goods and
services and consume forty-two bil-
lion dollars of them in ordinary family
and personal living expenses, the na-
tional supply of capital for the year will
amount to eight billion dollars. This
is the amount which will be available
to meet the demands of those who
desire to borrow capital. The supply
of capital is created by people who do
not consume the total amount of their
product, but who put a portion of it at
the disposal of the borrower. They
wait until the future before they enjoy,
through actual consumption, the fruit
of their efforts.
THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND
CAPITAL DEMAND
The borrowers, who make the de-
mand for capital, desire it for use in
production or for consumption and
enjoyment. They wish to buy and
have for immediate use the goods
which the suppliers of the capital have
produced. These goods are of two
sorts. They may consist of produced
goods devoted to further production,
like plant and machinery, raw mate-
rials and partly finished goods, and
other working capital which is to be
employed in the business activities in
which the borrower is engaged. Or
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they may consist of things which are
not used in production, but which are
employed for personal enjoyment, such
as houses, automobiles and furniture.
These durable goods used for consump-
tion, together with those used in pro-
ductive activities, constitute the na-
tional capital. Their distinguishing
characteristic is that they are durable
goods, and that their creation and use
involve the expenditure of productive
effort by people who are willing to wait
before they reap the full fruition of
their work. Money is simply one form
of these durable goods, and, like other
forms of capital wealth, is a useful
instrument. Its particular function is
to act as a medium of exchange in
carrying on the trading activities
incident to our modern industrial
process.
AN ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF MONEY
IN ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE Low
INTEREST RATES
It should be noted in passing, that
an abundant supply of money does not
in itself make interest lower. What
the borrower really desires is not money,
but the things which money will buy.
The important thing that the lender
does when he hands him his money is to
promise that he will wait for repayment,
postponing, in the meantime, his own
demand for goods upon the market.
This distinction between money and
capital is one which must be firmly
held in mind if utter confusion is to be
avoided in explaining fluctuations in
the interest rate.
It is true that while people desire
goods ultimately, they borrow not
goods, but money; and it would seem,
therefore, that more money would
mean a larger supply of the thing which
is immediately borrowed. And so it is.
Momentarily, such an increase does re-
duce the rate of interest, especially for
bank loans. When in 1915 and 1916
Europe sent America almost one billion
dollars in gold, this was added to the
bank reserves of the country. The
increased supply of money and the
bank credit which it served to support,
kept the bank rate low for a period of
two years, despite the fact that the
demand for loans increased greatly in
this period. As will be seen later,
the increase in money during this
period was supplemented by an actual
increase in saving. But without ques-
tion the great increase in the supply
of money and bank credit had an
immediate effect upon the rate of
interest.
But no one who has watched the
increasing volume of money and credit
and the rate of interest since 1917,
should labor any longer under the delu-
sion that an increase in the quantity of
money brings about a lower rate of
interest. The world has never had
half the quantity of money and credit
before that it has now; and it has not
for half a decade seen such high interest
rates. The reason why an increase
in the quantity of money cannot long
keep interest rates low is that it is
always accompanied by an increase in
the level of prices. Since the borrowers
desire not money but goods, they must
borrow a larger quantity of money
funds than before in order to buy the
same amount of capital goods. As
soon, therefore, as the increase in money
has effected an increase in price, the
demand for money funds increases as
rapidly as the supply, and interest
rates are fully as high as before. All
of this has been clear to economists
since the days of David Hume. It is
an increase in willingness to wait, an
increase in savings, not an increase in
money, which reduces the rate of
interest for long-time loans. The
supply of capital consists of savings,





In discussing the possible trend of
interest rates we shall accept the fol-
lowing propositions as fundamental.
Interest is the price paid for the use of
capital. Capital is created by produc-
ing more than one consumes. The
essence of the service which the lender
performs to the borrower is in the wait-
ing which he undergoes when he places
his purchasing power at the disposal of
another. From the standpoint of the
nation as a whole, the essence of capital
creation consists in the application of
labor and material to the production of
durable goods, like plant, machinery,
railroads and public utilities, houses
and automobiles, which give off their
uses gradually over a period of time,
and which therefore require waiting
between the production of the goods
and the enjoyment of the services
which they render. Since interest is a
price, it is determined by the forces of
supply and demand, and cannot be
greatly affected by legal enactment.
Money is only one form of capital,
and the supply of capital does not de-
pend upon the supply of money, but
upon the nation’s saving. An increase
in the quantity of money will not for
any considerable length of time reduce
the rate of interest.
DEMAND FACTORS HAVE HAD MAJOR
EFFECT ON INTEREST RATES
By far the most important fluctua-
tions in the fundamental factors which
control interest rates occur on the side
of demand. Whenever the demand for
capital for the construction of plant,
machinery, power plants, transporta-
tion facilities, automobiles, furniture
and musical instruments, has been
active, the rate of interest has risen in
consequence. This was the situation
during the ten years preceding the out-
break of the European war. During
that time the rate of interest on high-
grade bonds rose from 3y2 per cent to
almost 5 per cent. This was for sea-
soned bonds which were already in the
hands of permanent investors. The
rate paid for new capital obtained
from underwriters rose even more.
There is no doubt that during this very
period the supply of capital grew much
more rapidly than it ever had before.
The savings deposits of banks, the an-
nual savings through building and loan
associations and through life insurance
premiums, the reinvestment of profits
by corporations, the savings of the
farmers, all show increases in the supply
of capital which far exceeded anything
which this country had seen previous
to 1900.
But the demand for capital went on
at a rate which outran even this in-
crease in supply. During the decade
and a half which ended in 1914 the
United States became a great manufac-
turing nation. Cities in the middle
west, like Flint, Michigan, and Akron,
Ohio, had been &dquo;buckwheat towns&dquo;
in 1899; in 1913, they were manufac-
turing centers of importance. Pleas-
ant leisurely cities, like Detroit, grew
in a short space of time into manufac-
turing cities of first rank. The whole
public utility field multiplied its invest-
ment by about five during this period.
What this signifies for the demand for
capital will appear in the facts concern-
ing such a corporation as the Bell tele-
phone system. Between 1876 and 1900
this system had invested roughly
$300,000,000 in plant and equipment;
during the next thirteen years they in-
vested, in addition, twice that amount.
The amount of capital invested in elec-
tric light and power companies, in
street railways, in improvement to the
roadway and equipment of steam rail-
roads, far outran any rate of invest-
ment which had ever occurred before.
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In addition to this large growth of
American industries, both public and
private, there was an increase in expend-
iture on better buildings, upon pave-
ments and sidewalks, and above all
things else, upon a very much improved
and more expensive type of house.
No explanation of the increase in the
rate of interest which occurred just
before the outbreak of the European
war is possible without a recognition of
the revolution which had occurred dur-
ing this period in residential construc-
tion.
All of this increase in the demand for
capital was occasioned in large measure
by the swing-out of invention and tech-
nical improvements following the ad-
vent of electricity and the general
application of science to the problems
of industry. One invention of the
period deserves particular mention
because of its importance in the de-
mand for capital. The automobile
was developed and came into popular
use during this period. This not only
called for capital with which to erect
factories, but every motor car was it-
self a source of demand for capital,
because it was a durable good whose
use involved waiting. By 1914 the
people of the United States had accum-
ulated a stock of almost two million
automobiles. These had created a
demand for capital which had been
non-existent previous to this decade.
In the- capital markets of the world
a similar development in industry
created a like increase in the demand
for capital, and drove up interest rates.
But the outside world had a further
source of demand which had been absent
during the period from 1871 to 1900:
those years had been years of peace.
War is always a source of greatly in-
creased demand for capital. A war of
first magnitude, such as that of 1914
to 1918, absorbs practically the entire
excess of production over consumption
while it is going on. In the case of the
European nations it went even farther
than this and absorbed not only the
new supply of capital created during
the period of hostilities, but encroached
upon the previously created capital
as well.
The period from 1900 to 1914 was
not free from war as had been the
thirty years previous. Just at the
close of that thirty years, in 1898,
came the Spanish-American war. It
was not of sufficient duration or extent
to strain the national supply of capital.
In 1900 came the Boer war, which cost
England more than one billion dollars,
to say nothing of the cost to the Boers.
In 1904 occurred the Russo-Japanese
war; this absorbed the entire capital of
both parties to the conflict, and, in
addition, called upon the European
markets for more than one billion
dollars’ worth of capital. Only a few
years elapsed before the Balkan wars
broke out. The demand for capital
for military purposes was active, there-
fore, throughout the decade which pre-
ceded the European war. All these
forces working to increase the demand
for capital had raised the rate of inter-
est by almost one-half between 1904
and 1914.
THE CONTRAST IN CAPITAL DEMAND
DURING THE PERIODS 1890-1900
AND 1900-1914
This period of rising rates of interest
may be set in contrast with the period
which had preceded it-a period in
which interest rates fell even in the face
of a fairly small supply of capital. In
1898 the President of the New York
State Bankers’ Association, an experi-
enced practical banker of unusual sense
and insight, said in his annual address:
The days of six per cent interest are gone,
only to return at troubled intervals when
normal conditions are disturbed. The
choicest investments yield less than 3 per
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cent. Some railroad bonds commanding
31 per cent command a premium. Rentals
are proportionately reduced, and these con-
ditions have come to stay. The growing
wealth of this country is enormous, and as a
permanent condition we must recognize
four per cent as a good return for invest-
ment.
This statement shows the general
situation which prevailed at the time.
Interest rates were low, and wise, prac-
tical men thought they would not
again rise. What this practical banker
did not foresee was the great increase in
industrial enterprise and activity, ac-
companied by largely increased profits
and an enormous growth in the demand
for capital with which men could seek
those profits. Nor could he foresee
that the world was to enter upon two
decades of war and rumors of war, end-
ing in the most destructive orgy which
the world had yet witnessed.
During the nineties, the country had
experienced a severe depression, which
had diminished production, cut down
profits, brought financial ruin to indi-
viduals and businesses, and discour-
aged enterprise generally. The profits
of the national banks of the United
States as a whole were 6% per cent
during the ten years 1890-1899; in the
decade 1900-1909, they were 9.88 per
cent. These profits are simply a reflec-
tion of the profits which were being
made in industry generally in the years
after 1900. In such a situation the
demand for capital was small, even at
low rates of interest. After 1899, busi-
ness had revived, production was thriv-
ing, profits were high, the spirit of bus-
iness enterprise was’exuberant, and men
demanded large quantities of capital at
high rates of interest. When profits
are 10 per cent men will bid much
higher and more actively than when
they are 6% per cent. The difference
between the rates of interest which pre-
vailed in the two decades is to be
explained by this difference in the two
situations, and by the manner in which
that difference affected the demand for
capital.
THE FUTURE TREND OF INTEREST
RATES WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE
DEGREE OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Will the situation for the future be
more like that of the nineties, when the
demand for capital was low and when
interest rates fell in consequence, or
will it resemble the decade which fol-
lowed 1903? Will business men be
optimistic? Will their profits be large,
and will they be bidding constantly
and anxiously for capital at a high rate?
If we are entering a period when the
business of the country will be charac-
terized by conservatism, by a tendency
to expend only such an amount of
capital as is necessary to put existing
plants in order, rather than to build new
plants and promote new enterprises,
and if investors are inclined to demand
bonds and other safe investments
rather than stocks and speculative se-
curities, then the rate of interest is sure
to fall.
BANK RATES SURE TO FALL
What then is the outlook for the
immediate future? To the extent that
the rate of interest means the bank
rate for short-time loans, it has fallen
even now and seems due to fall further
in the near future. Here the demand
is for money, and the banker’s lending
power is determined primarily by the
state of banking reserves. One year
ago the ratio of the reserves of the
Federal Reserve Banks to the deposit
and Federal Reserve note liabilities
was 42.8 per cent. In such a situation
the additional lending power of the
member banks was rapidly approach-
ing extinction. On June 29, 1921 the
reserve ratio stood at 60.8. It bids
fair to rise more in the immediate
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future. In part, this increase in reserve
ratio has been brought about by a de-
crease in loans of member banks fol-
lowed by a decrease in deposits, which
in turn led to reduced reserve require-
ments with the Federal Reserve Banks,
and to a decrease of approximately
twenty per cent in the volume of Fed-
eral Reserve notes outstanding since
the high point of last December. In
part, the improvement in the ratio is
due to an increase of five hundred
million dollars in the gold reserve of the
Federal Reserve banks.
With a reserve ratio of more than
60 per cent, and with a fall in the de-
mand for loans occasioned by the de-
cline in business activity and falling
prices, the interest on bank loans could
not long remain at its high level. The
call rate has fallen materially, for the
reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks
of New York and Boston are far above
those of the other ten banks. It is
improbable too, that the Federal
Reserve Board will keep rediscount
rates at their former level in view of the
growing reserve ratio. Bank rates,
then, will surely fall.
CAPITAL DEMAND FOR NEW ENTER-
PRISES WILL NOT BE HEAVY DUR-
ING THE NEXT Two YEARS
In an analysis of the more funda-
mental question of rates on long-time
loan, like mortgages and new bond
issues of substantial concerns, munic-
ipal bonds, and the yield of stable
bonds quoted on the exchanges, the
situation is more complex. But if one
keeps in mind the fundamental fact
that the primary factor which makes a
large demand for capital is the desire of
the people to get capital for the con-
struction of durable permanent wealth,
for production and consumption, he
will be able to forecast the situation in
its main outlines at least. The demand
for capital to be used in the promotion
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of new business enterprises will be
comparatively slight during the next
two years.
Not a few people believe that the
demand for capital for the promotion
and extension of industrial plants will
be the source of a large demand for all
our available capital. They argue
that the development of American
enterprises has been suspended or
checked since the outbreak of the war,
and that the resumption of expansion
is inevitable. It sounds rather queer
to hear almost in the same breath that
the expansion of industrial plants has
been checked, and that productive
capacity has far outrun domestic con-
sumption. If we can produce twenty-
five per cent more than the home con-
sumer will purchase, and if industrial
profits are lagging in consequence, there
can be no great need for immediate
expansion. There is much reason to
believe that our expansion of industrial
plants from July, 1915, to July, 1918,
was at a quite unprecedented rate.
We must distinguish here, too,
between the desire for capital and the
effective demand for capital. The
hungry boy outside the candy shop has
an enormous desire for the shopkeeper’s
product, but his wants do not constitute
effective demand. So there will be
many promoters of business ventures
who desire the capital of the investing
public, who will not be able to present
an argument attractive enough to con-
vert their want into an effective demand.
The investor simply will not listen to
them at all, and that source of demand
which has been so large for the past few
years will be much reduced for the
period immediately confronting us.
CAPITAL FOR BUILDING WILL BE
AVAILABLE WHEN THE BUILDING
REVIVAL COMES
The largest demand that is now in
prospect for capital is that which arises
34
out of building, especially residential
construction, and out of the need for
public improvements, including im-
provements of our public utilities and
railroad system. If the building boom
were actively under way at this moment
the acceleration of that demand would
offset the decline in other directions in
considerable measure. But thus far,
the public has not had sufficient con-
fidence in the future price of houses to
make it willing to engage in construc-
tion on any large scale at present
building costs. Before the building
trade revives in sufficient degree to
make a large draft upon the supply of
capital, the volume of that supply will
be quite sufficient to meet the demand
at a rate materially lower than the one
which now prevails.
ABSORPTION OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL
BONDS NOT A SERIOUS MATTER
True, the demand for capital from
states and municipalities for the prose-
cution of projects like road-building
and for the payment of soldiers’
bonuses is large. But it will probably
not be in excess of one billion dollars
per year and much of it will remain
capital instead of being spent for con-
sumption goods. The soldier who
draws a bonus of $300 and pays a loan
at a bank, or makes a payment against
the mortgage on his home, or deposits it
in a bank as a savings account, or buys
a safe bond already on the market, does
not make any demand for new capital.
In a nation which is saving, as we prob-
ably are even this year, between six
and eight billion dollars per annum,
the absorption of a billion dollars of
s£ate and municipal bonds is not a
serious matter.
It is true there is a large volume of
refunding of railroad, industrial, and
government bonds which must be
carried through within the next few
years. But refunding does not absorb
new capital except to the extent that
the bondholder spends his money when
he is paid off. Most bondholders are
not that sort of people.
THE FOREIGN DEMAND FOR CAPITAL
WILL PROBABLY NOT REACH A
BILLION A YEAR
There remains the foreign demand.
We hear much these days of the tre-
mendous waste of capital in Europe
during the war, and the billions upon
billions needed to repair that waste.
It is true that Europe needs capital and
wants capital for the rehabilitation of
her industries. The United States has
sent it to her in abundant measure dur-
ing the last five years. Even since the
signing of the Armistice we have been
sending her more than two billion
dollars per year. And she will desire
much capital for the future. But this
is again a case of the hungry boy out-
side the candy shop. Europe’s wants
for capital will not become effective
demand to any such extent as many
people believe. It is doubtful whether
during the next five years we will send
her as much as one billion dollars per
year. She would gladly take more
than this at good interest rates, but
American investors will not be willing
to accept the security which she can
offer in return for any great amount of
capital. The experience of our export-
ers of capital to Europe thus far is not
one to make us optimistic on this
point.
EXAGGERATION OF NEED OF
EXPORTING CAPITAL
The necessity of exporting capital
to keep foreign trade going and thus
keep the wheels of American industry
turning, seems to me to be much exag-
gerated. Another statement from the
address of the President of the New
York Bankers’ Association in 1898
shows how easy it is to overestimate the
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necessity for export of capital. He
puts his conception of the relation of
American industry to foreign trade in
1898 thus:
Our capacity to produce far exceeds our
capacity to consume. The home market
can no longer keep furnaces in blast oi looms
in action. That capital may earn its incre-
ment and labor be employed enterprise
must contend in the markets of the world
for the sale of our surplus product....
Our money and our credit must follow and
aid our merchandise in seeking customers
in those countries that consume more than
they produce.
This statement was made after busi-
ness had been stagnant in this country
for four years. During the fifteen
years which followed, American indus-
try produced an unprecedented volume
of goods, and got them all consumed
without exporting capital to Europe.
The average income per man, woman,
and child in this country is only about
$500 per annum. Even a college
professor’s family can consume more
than that! t
THE OUTLOOK IS FOR REDUCED CAPI-
TAL DEMAND AND SUPPLY
The net export of American capital,
after allowing for gold movements,
has been reduced 40 per cent since a
year ago. The corporate security
issues for the first five months of 1921,
which require new capital rather than
refunding, are likewise 40 per cent
below those of 1920. Taking the situa-
tion as a whole the outlook is for a
demand, both for bank loans and for
long-time investment capital, much
below that which we have witnessed dur-
ing the last five years.
On the side of supply there will also
be a reduction. The very fact that
the supply of capital is determined by
the excess of production over con-
sumption makes this inevitable.
NVhen production decreases, savings
must fall unless consumption is cut
down by a like amount. In periods
of industrial depression the fall in pro-
ductive output is always the most strik-
ing feature of the situation. Con-
sumption falls somewhat, but to a
smaller degree than production, so that
there is some decline in savings, espe-
cially in the earlier stages of business
depression when the decline in produc-
tion is acute. As industry works out of
this first stage and production revives
in some degree, consumption still
remains low. As a result of these
forces the supply of capital falls less
than does the demand. The result is a
decline in the rate of interest.
Not only does the supply decline less
than the demand, but in times of depres-
sion the available supply is shifted
away from the highly risky and specu-
lative market to the market for safe
and seasoned securities where the rate
is habitually lower. The interest rate
to borrowers who have high-grade
security to offer falls decidedly, there-
fore, in such times.
It is a fact worth noting in this con-
nection, that the Liberty bonds sold
upon the New York Stock Exchange
declined in volume from one billion
three hundred million dollars in the
first five months of 1920 to seven
hundred and thirty million in the cor-
responding months of 1921. Evidently
people are already more anxious to
hold the high-grade securities which
they have, than to sell them and invest
the proceeds in more speculative ven-
tures. As soon as these securities
begin to rise decidedly in the market,
this tendency will be accelerated.
THE TREND OF INTEREST RATES
WILL BE DOWNWARD
Upon the whole, it is most likely that
the supply of capital for well-seasoned
securities will equal the demand at a
rate Qf interest decidedly lower than
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that which now prevails. We will not
return for a long time to the low interest
rates of twenty years ago, but it seems
entirely likely that we will work well
down to the level of 1913. Liberty
bonds, unless some unforeseen event
arises, should be at par within three
years, and all high-grade investment
securities of long maturities should rise
accordingly.
It is always difficult to forecast for
any considerable period in the future
the resultant of such complex forces as
those which underlie the rate of interest.
But the fundamental factors which
operate upon the demand for capital
and those which determine its supply
after a period of business depression
are such as will inevitably reduce the
rate of interest.
Industrial Waste
By L. W. WALLACE, M.E.
Executive Secretary of the Federated American Engineering Societies
IN January, 1921, Herbert Hoover, asJL president of the Federated Ameri-
can Engineering Societies, named seven-
teen engineers to make a study of waste
in industry. The federation of engin-
eering societies was new; Mr. Hoover
was its first president. At the organ-
izing meeting held in Washington in
November, 1920, mar. Hoover proposed
the study and was authorized to make
the investigation.
There was peculiar fitness in the sub-
ject thus undertaken by the Federated
American Engineering Societies, inas-
much as the object of the organization
is to further public welfare whenever
technical knowledge and engineering
experience are involved, and to consider
and act upon matters of common con-
cern to the engineering and allied
technical professions. The &dquo;assay of
waste&dquo; undertaken by the Committee
on Elimination of Waste in Industry
was, as Mr. Hoover outlined it, to be
a three months’ investigation of a
series of &dquo;samples&dquo; from-which might
be deduced general recommendations
applicable to American industry as a
whole.
The personnel of the committee con-
sisted of eighteen carefully selected en-
gineers. In selecting the members of
the committee, care was taken to secure
men of broad experience, clear concepts,
and unbiased attitude towards indus-
trial problems. Representatives of
managerial, consultant, educational
and editorial activities were chosen,
with an eye also to their widely dis-
tributed and varied industrial con-
tacts.
When the &dquo; assay &dquo; began, the com-
mittee itself selected with great care the
engineers who conducted the field in-
vestigations. The engineering firm em-
ployed to investigate a given industry
was chosen because it had a long and a
favorable record in that particular type
of industry. Thus was brought to bear
upon the plans, findings and recom-
mendations, the accumulated and com-
posite knowledge and experience of some
fifty or more engineers. In many phases
of the work other specialists, such as
economists, statisticians, employment
managers and industrial physicians
had an important part in collecting the
material and in drawing up the conclu-
sions. An earnest effort was made to
obtain the advice and the accumulated
information of every known agency
or individual that could throw any
light upon the subject in the time
allowed.
